CMA CGM prepares full service resume via Suez Canal
CMA CGM's India to United States INDAMEX loop via the Suez Canal will return to full service following months of large scale diversions around Cape of Good Hope. CMA CGM announced this decision after conducting limited, backhaul Red Sea transits designed to test security conditions and operational reliability.
Industry analysts report that CMA CGM's restored routing will shorten full loop transit time by approximately two weeks, cutting the round voyage down to approximately seventy seven days while simultaneously enabling it to reduce vessel count by two vessels while maintaining weekly frequency. To take full advantage of the change in risk levels along the corridor and mitigate risks in accordance with business considerations for selected services, they plan to deploy ships between six thousand and ten thousand TEU on this repositioned loop.
Even with this step taken by Egypt to restore ocean access through the Suez Canal, overall access remains far below pre conflict levels. Data from Xeneta noted in recent reporting shows only 120 container ships transited the canal in November twenty two five, compared with 583 before attacks escalated against merchant shipping in Red Sea. Other major carriers like Hapag Lloyd, Maersk and ZIM continue to signal gradual and selective approaches towards any wide return; for example ZIM emphasizes war risk insurers must offer adequate cover before opening Red Sea routings up to regular traffic again.
Red Sea access continues to improve, yet risk still keeps most carriers diverting around it.
Security conditions in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden have improved, following Houthi signals of an end to attacks against commercial vessels, but market and security analysts stress that a full restoration of liner services to pre conflict routing remains unlikely in the short term. Advisory assessments released mid November noted that while missile and drone strikes have significantly decreased since November 1st, continued instability within Yemen remains an obstacle to carrier and insurer trust.
Industry sources indicate that war risk premiums, additional security measures and potential sudden route closures make Cape of Good Hope diversion an attractive alternative for many operators serving Asian to Europe and Asian to North American trades. While using the longer route is associated with higher bunker consumption and transit times, carriers and cargo interests seem willing to bear these costs in exchange for more predictable risk profiles for heavily loaded headhaul legs and high value cargoes. Market commentary indicates that any broad reopening of the Red Sea will likely occur gradually over time and closely linked with tangible changes to security environments or underwriting policies
European and United States regulators are keeping an eye on the security situation closely as any sudden shift back to Suez routes could have severe repercussions for port congestion, storage demand and short sea feeder networks. Freight market analysts warn that any sudden concentration of capacity through the canal, especially before risk stabilisation occurs, could expose supply chains to renewed disruption from even isolated security incidents. At present, however, incremental testing by select carriers using naval escorted routes or enhanced onboard precautions appears to be the norm rather than system wide restoration of traditional Red Sea/Suez access.
Global freight markets have taken measures to circumvent security vulnerabilities associated with ocean access.
Security briefings from November demonstrate how ocean access has become more restricted across a series of regional flashpoints, including the Red Sea, Black Sea, Baltic Sea and select Asian chokepoints. In the Black Sea alone, unexploded ordnance remains an imminent danger to commercial traffic; incidents have been reported off Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey coasts with surface vessels found unmanned. Shipping companies operating here face routing constraints, higher insurance costs and must coordinate closely with naval authorities when planning port calls or coastal passages.
Analysts describe Russia Ukraine conflict spillover into the Baltic Sea through what are known as hybrid operations - including sabotage and electronic warfare targeting navigation and communications systems - as hybrid warfare operations, including deliberate GPS and AIS signal interference with reported cases raising grounding risks, collision risks, compliance difficulties with traffic separation schemes in congested waters as well as concerns over militaryisation of merchant vessels that has led to detentions at ports in Germany, Sweden and Norway.
Malaysia's tougher enforcement against unauthorised anchoring and illegal ship transfers has significantly altered patterns of offshore activity in Southeast Asia. Malaysia recently closed Tanjung Piai anchorage near the eastern entrance to Singapore Strait earlier in 2016 and since has intensified enforcement against vessels who anchor or conduct transfers without proper approvals, as well as designated anchorages off Muar in western Johor which require prior authorisation for legal offshore activities along this busy corridor.
NATO exercises strengthen Baltic maritime security while encouraging commercial access.
NATO has increased its naval presence and training activities in the Baltic Sea as part of wider efforts to safeguard critical sea lines of communication and undersea infrastructure in the region. In early December, allies conducted Freezing Winds exercise deploying surface combatants, submarines, maritime patrol aircraft and surface combatant units to practice coordinated responses to mine threats, submarine activity as well as hybrid challenges like sabotage or interference by electronic interference and hybrid threats such as electronic interference from mines or minefields. The drills aim to improve interoperability and resilience across fleets as well as protect critical shipping lanes & energy links essential for regional trade.
Although Freezing Winds is a military exercise, its objectives are tightly related to protecting freedom of navigation for merchant shipping by deterring hostile activity and improving regional navies' ability to respond rapidly in incidents. Maritime security advisers note that naval patrols, surveillance assets and information sharing through NATO structures help commercial operators transiting the Baltic safely despite an uncertain strategic environment. The exercise sends an important signal to traders and shipowners that allied governments are prepared to invest in protecting critical maritime infrastructure that supports European energy security and supply chains.
Under these circumstances, shipowners and charterers are tightening up voyage planning and risk management strategies for Baltic calls, including more stringent monitoring of notices to mariners, advisories on electronic interference, anchoring/routing guidance updates, etc. Insurers likewise factor the heightened naval posture into their assessments of war risk premiums for the region - further linking public security measures with commercial considerations related to ocean access.